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Max Rheinsteint
Two major books on jurisprudence were published in 1971, John
Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Albert Ehrenzweig's Psychoanalytic
Jurisprudence.Rawls has presented us with a comprehensive and systematic theory of justice; Ehrenzweig's aim is to prove the futility of
all attempts to determine the meaning and content of justice. The
contrast, however, is more apparent than real. Rawls does not attempt
to give us the theory of justice, but a theory of justice that, in my view,
expresses the vision of the Western Liberal in the mid-twentieth century. And Ehrenzweig's enterprise, does it not perhaps express a theory
of justice that is akin to Rawls's-the theory of justice of modem pluralist society?
For millenia mankind has speculated about justice. What is it? What
is the relationship between justice and law? Can law be unjust? How,
if at all, can injustice of the law be avoided? These questions have long
troubled philosophers, theologians, jurists, lawyers, statesmen, and,
not the least, ordinary people. They have found many different answers.
A survey of a vast number of such attempts constitutes the first part of
Ehrenzweig's book. It is a comprehensive presentation of the jurisprudential theories propounded from antiquity to the present day.
The multitude of positions is presented pointedly and succinctly. Readers will find that this bird's eye view is a convenient, well-structured,
and stimulating guide through the labyrinth of jurisprudence.
Few are those who, like Hobbes, have identified justice with the
law whatever it may be. There is agreement that law may be unjust.
By what standard, however, can we determine the justice or injustice
of the law, be it of a total legal order or some particular law within a
legal order of which the justice or near justice is conceded? It is over
definition of this yardstick that minds have split. "Judgments on
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justice," Ehrenzweig states, "vary with their author, time and place."1
Advocates of different notions of justice have rarely been satisfied with
merely stating their views. They claim absolute validity for their own
ideas, and, so Ehrenzweig finds, they often attack those of others with
violence and passion. Ehrenzweig believes that he knows the reason
for this emotional display and that the angry controversy can be calmed.
Science has reached a stage at which the existence of the opposing views
can be explained and resolved on a higher plane. The science by which
this futile battle is to be ended, by which the truly relevant problems
can be revealed and fruitfully attacked in ways of reason rather than
emotion, is psychology, more specifically Freudian psychoanalysis.
A convincing case is made that the traditional arguments on justice
are irrational and emotional in nature and thus that efforts to solve
practical problems of social life through such argumentation are
futile. But doubt must be raised as to whether Freudian psychoanalysis is the best way to approach these problems. Ehrenzweig believes
in it, however, and this belief can be shaken by logical argument as
little as any other faith.
Freudian psychoanalysis appears to be a fascinating combination of
deep insights of lasting value and futile attempts to penetrate mysteries
of the human mind that are still inaccessible given the limited methods
of search presently at mankind's disposal. Thus the resort to psychoanalysis has forced Ehrenzweig simultaneously to explain too much
and too little.
The irrational, or perhaps intuitive prerational, character of the
arguments traditionally used in theoretical and practical discussions
about justice are unmasked by Ehrenzweig and shown to be products
of the subconscious or, as we might prefer to express it, emotions. He
succeeds in using modern science to penetrate the facade of seemingly
rational verbiage, thus making it possible for practical men to recognize practical problems for what they are and to seek solutions by means
of rational analysis.
Ehrenzweig further attempts, however, to explain the traditional
disdain for stating political arguments in practical terms and the preference for arguments couched in terms of high morals and religion. His
psychoanalytic approach leads him to the conclusion that this inclination is a result of the Ego's fear of the urges of the subconscious Id
and its respect for the subconsciously recognized demands of the Superego. Articulation of the ambivalence of the human personality is one
immensely important achievement of modem psychology, and Freud's
1 P. 150.
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demonstration that the subconscious struggle of opposite desires results
in tension has been of high significance. The passionate character of discussions on justice is well explained by these insights. With all due respect, however, we hesitate to regard this as the full explanation of
man's reluctance to reveal his true motives to others and to himself
and his tendency to hide these motives behind invocations of an eternal
order, God's word, justice, law, common good, and the like.
The theoretical and concrete-political discussions of justice are an
insoluble mixture of genuine beliefs in ideals of justice and self- or
group-interests expressed in terms of altruistic concern for the common
good. For example, Ehrenzweig wonders how so illustrious a man as
Roscoe Pound could oppose a plan of no-fault insurance as an attack
upon the free society and a beginning of socialism.2 One possible explanation is that Pound was editor-in-chief of the NACCA Law Journal.3
Another manner in which the ideal of justice is today finding expression is the postulate of equality. In that postulate Superego idealism
does have a role; the postulate of equality, however, could as easily be
an angry expression of envy, appearing in psychoanalytic terms as an
aspect of the Id, or a facade for simple self-interest. In this context it
is interesting that the successful attack on the Illinois scheme of nofault insurance as violative of the constitutional equal protection guarantee was initiated by the Association of Trial Lawyers. In a discussion
recently held by an organization of divorce lawyers, no-fault divorce was
criticized in terms of morality, religion, and the sanctity of marriage;
finally one of the members blurted out, "Gentlemen, if that law is
passed one-half of us will have to close shop." Vulgus vult decipi. By
no means is all talk about justice cant, but this possibility deserves no
less emphasis than the emotive form of the Superego in its clashes with
the Id.
We have dwelt on doubts about the usefulness of expressing psychological insights in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis because of a fear
that this approach will provoke misunderstandings and unnecessary
attacks upon an important book that can well help us to clarify age-old
controversies and throw the light of reason on problems that are too
often obscured by passion hiding behind high-sounding but empty
verbiage.
One of the most clarifying of Ehrenzweig's ideas is his distinction
between the sense of justice universal to all mankind and the variety
2 P. 253.
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of "justnesses," i.e. ideals of justice visualized in different environments
by different human beings, or even contradictory ideals simultaneously
held by the same individual. 4 This idea is fertile. In the somewhat different form of the distinction between the one concept of justice and
the various conceptions of justice it is mentioned in the work of John
Rawls. 5 In Albert Ehrenzweig's scheme it plays a vital role; it was suggested to him by the investigations of his brother Anton into the realm
of aesthetics. Man's ideals of beauty, the "beautnesses," are manifold
(de gustibus non est disputandum), but universal to all men is the irresistible thirst for beauty and an equally irresistible abhorrence of
ugliness, whatever these protean ideas may signify. Once we recognize
that the number of justnesses or beautnesses is infinite, we must realize
that although there are universal senses of justice and beauty, all attempts to regard these uniform urges as capable of being satisfied by
any uniform idea of justice or beauty are futile. This clarifying insight
might also be extended to the sense of truth, for the urge to comprehend the "true" ultimate essence of all being is universal among mankind. Ehrenzweig might tell us, however, that these "truenesses"-or
more simply the "truths" by which the universal urge for Truth is
sought to be stilled-are infinitely varied. In wise abstention, he has
resisted the temptation to venture into this realm of metaphysics.
The book is already rich enough in subject matter, thought, and
suggestion. Its full title is Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence-On Ethics,
Aesthetics, and "Law"-On Crime, Tort, and Procedure. The scope
of the author's learning is stupendous, and he is at home in all of the
fields indicated in the title. The bibliography covers eighty-one pages.
The work is the product of a comprehensive humanist mind, able to
draw upon the literature of the world as an accomplished linguist, upon
the experiences of the ages as an historian, and upon the civil and common law legal systems as a comparatist.
Throughout the book, law is viewed as a phenomenon universal to
all mankind, rather than as the legal system peculiar to one people or
one age. A major part of the book, however, contains a specific comparison of the common law and civil law systems.8 Ehrenzweig starts
out from often repeated statements, expressing widely held views on
either side about alleged characteristics of the other. Some such statements express emotional prejudices, as for instance the view not infrequently found in Anglo-American countries that the common law and
especially its type of procedure is the law of freedom while the civil
4
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law is the law of authority and officiousness. When psychoanalysis is
applied, however, one is told that the common law judge is a father
figure, and that his reluctance actively to participate in the conduct of
a law suit is an expression of the ambivalence of being a partriarch who
is simultaneously exposed to reverence and reduced to impotence7
Here, just as with theories of justice, name-calling, snap judgments,
and misleading generalizations are not inconspicuous, but are they not
due more to ignorance than to psychological tensions?
With the growth of interest in foreign laws, the expansion of international legal practice, the intense contacts among scholars, and the
consequential increase in competent writing, the old lump sum judgments are disappearing. It is certainly too crude to characterize the
common law as judge-made and the civil law as codified, to label the
former as inductive and the latter as deductive, to identify the civil
law with Roman law, or to overlook the profound differences that exist
between the various legal systems of the civil law group. With expert
knowledge and fine intuition Ehrenzweig culls the grains of truth from
the generalizations that hide them.
In his discussion of procedure in general and of civil procedure in
particular Ehrenzweig is a severe critic of the traditional American system. He aptly exposes the fallacy of contrasting an "inquisitorial" civil
law scheme with an "adversary" common law scheme. He correctly
points out that weaknesses in the procedure of France, Italy, and other
civil law countries are due to a reluctance to give inquisitorial powers
to the judge and to reduce the 'adversary style of the proceedings. He
emphasizes the differences of these systems, widely regarded as obsolete,
from the system that was initiated in Austria at the turn of the century.
Ehrenzweig sees the strength of the Austrian system in the judge's enlarged powers to expedite the course of the law suit and actively to
participate in the evidentiary stage. He regards such a system as superior
to those of both France and the United States. But shall one underestimate the strength and the pace of the American movement for reform?
Shall one seek the reason for resistance mainly in psychological blocks?
Psychology also appears to explain insufficiently the differences between
the Occidental view of the law and courts as instruments of deciding
between all or nothing and the Oriental preference for compromise
8
over litigation.
The proposition that the tort law's adherence to the fault principle,
and its resistance to replace it with a system of liability for risk, is
7 P. 271.
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rooted in Man's masochistic desire for self-punishment is as unproved
and as unprovable as a psychoanalyst's allegation that overly solicitous
parents "often" unconsciously desire to see their children become delinquent. 9 Ehrenzweig's plan of loss insurance, 10 however, is a wellconsidered specimen of the schemes now being discussed as feasible
devices for protecting the victims of enterprise risk.
A work ranging over so vast a field necessarily provokes the suspicion
of superficiality; such a suspicion would be unfounded in this case. No
problem is shunned and no difficulty glossed over. The fact that it
could all be compressed into 249 pages of text is astonishing. Certainly
a price had to be paid for this conciseness; the vast number of conflicting views expressed over the centuries that are critically surveyed by
the author are indicated more by apt labels than explicit presentation.
Unfortunately, hardly any reader can be expected to be familiar with
all of the world's writings. Nevertheless all those who, like the present
reviewer, are not precisely familiar with the existentialists, psychoanalysts, or phenomenologists will deeply enjoy the challenge of the work.
The book will meet resistance. Believers in some kind of ultimate
truth must resent that the firm and deep convictions for which they
will continue to fight with passion and appeals to ultimate ideals are
here reduced to unconscious tensions. Living with tension and with
knowledge that neither the Beautiful nor the Just nor the True can
ever be defined with universal validity is unsettling. Psychology has
shown that Man is a being full of contradictory urges. We must learn
to live in a world of tension, around us and within us.
In the front of Ehrenzweig's book there is a reproduction of what
seems to be a sixteenth-century engraving. Under the motto In contrariaducet---"It will run into controversy"-the ship sails against the
wind. But it goes full speed.
9 P. 254.
10 Pp. 254-55.

